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HOW ARE PRACTICES MADE TO VARY? MANAGING PRACTICE 
ADAPTATION IN A MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Research has shown that management practices are adapted and ‘made to fit’ the specific 
context into which they are adopted. Less attention has been paid to how organizations 
anticipate and purposefully influence the adaptation process. How do organizations manage 
the tension between allowing local adaptation of a management practice and retaining control 
over the practice? By studying the adaptation of a specialized quality management practice – 
ACE (Achieving Competitive Excellence) – in a multinational corporation in the aerospace 
industry, we examine how the organization manages the adaptation process at the corporate 
and subsidiary levels. We identified three strategies through which an organization balances 
the tension between standardization and variation – preserving the ‘core’ practice while 
allowing local adaptation at the subsidiary level; 1) creating and certifying progressive 
achievement levels; 2) setting discretionary and mandatory adaptation parameters; and 3) 
differentially adapting to context-specific and systemic misfits. While previous studies have 
shown how and why practices vary as they diffuse, we show how practices may diffuse 
because they are engineered to vary for allowing a better fit with diverse contextual 
specificities. 
  
 
Key words: aerospace, adaptation, adoption, diffusion, lean, management innovation, 
multinational corporations, practices, quality management, standards. 
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Introduction 
 
The challenge is: How do you create a practice that is meaningful – that has enough 
structure and boundaries that it can’t morph into different things but it is not so specific 
and tight that it doesn’t add value to different types of organizations? They don’t see 
the value-added (if too specific). Then they perceive it (the practice) as bureaucratic 
and it subsequently dies. So you need to have that fine balance between these two 
extremes. (ACE Manager) 
 
Recent years have attracted resurgent academic interest in innovative management practices 
that play a crucial role in achieving and sustaining competitiveness at the firm, industry and 
the national levels (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2010; Damanpour, Walker & Avellaneda, 2009; 
Mol & Birkinshaw, 2008; Volberda, Van Den Bosch & Heij, 2013). While the rationale 
behind organizational adoption of innovative management practices is well researched (e.g., 
Abrahamson, 1991; Mazza & Alvarez, 2000; Mol & Birkinshaw, 2009; Sturdy, 2004), the 
subsequent implementation and adaptation of these practices needs more attention (Bromley, 
Hwang & Powell, 2012; Gondo & Amis, 2013). This is because management practices often 
do not spread ‘as is’ as per some earlier epidemiological diffusion models (Garfield, 1980; 
Morris, 1993). Instead, practices are likely to be adapted during diffusion – arguably a 
dynamic, contested and emergent process (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010; Drori, Höllerer, & 
Walgenbach, 2013; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007) – that is ‘temporally and 
contextually provisional’ (Orlikowski, 2000).   
Indeed, hardly any management practice qualifies as a ‘one size fits all’. Practices 
frequently get reconfigured during implementation to make them meaningful and suitable 
within specific organizational contexts (Robertson, Swan, & Newell, 1996; Sahlin- 
Andersson, 1996; Strang & Kim, 2004; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). Examples 
include TQM (David & Strang, 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), Six Sigma (Canato, Ravasi & 
Phillips, forthcoming; Parast, 2011), Manufacturing Best Practice Programmes (Love & 
Cebon, 2008), Telemedicine (Nicolini, 2010), Strategic Planning (Bromley et al., 2012), Self-
Managing Teams (Vaccaro, Volberda & Van den Bosch, 2012), Corporate Social 
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Responsibility (Höllerer, 2013), and Responsible Investment (Gond & Boxenbaum, 
forthcoming). Practice variation is thus likely to be the rule, rather than the exception 
(Campbell, 2005; Mamman, 2002; O’Mahoney, 2007). As Gherardi and Nicolini (2000) and 
Akrich, Callon and Latour (2002) note: to ‘transfer is to transform’ and ‘to adopt is to adapt’.  
Recent work on the diffusion of management practices has revealed novel insights into 
how practices are modified across networks, projects, and geographies (Perez-Aleman, 2011) 
due to a potential lack of technical, cultural, or political ‘fit’ between the practice and its new 
local context (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Canato et al., forthcoming; Fiss, Kennedy & Greve, 
2011). While scholars have examined diffusion and adaptation of practices at the field level 
(e.g., Bromley et al. 2012; Fiss, et al., 2011; Gond & Boxenbaum, forthcoming), there has 
been less research about adaptation within organizations (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Adaptation 
within organizations may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, organizations seek to 
discourage ‘undesired’ adaptations of the sort that damage the integrity of the management 
practice (Ansari et al., 2010). On the other hand, organizations strive to encourage 
‘beneficial’ adaptations of the sort where ‘imperfect imitation’ increases practice 
effectiveness (Posen, Lee & Yi, 2013) or facilitate innovation (Canato et al., forthcoming). 
How do organizations manage this tension between maintaining the practice’s integrity and 
allowing for variation? 
To address this question, we focus on the adaptation of practices at the intra-organizational 
level. By studying the adaptation of the quality management practice ACE (Achieving 
Competitive Excellence) in a multinational corporation in the aerospace industry, we examine 
how the adaptation of the management practice is actively managed by the company. 
We contribute in three ways. First, while previous studies have shown how and why 
practices vary as they diffuse, we show how practices may diffuse because they are enabled 
to vary in order to increase their zone of acceptance in diverse local contexts. Allowing 
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adaptation in line with different contextual needs (Benders & van Veen, 2001) increases 
acceptability and can promote more extensive implementation (Ansari et al., 2010). Second, 
we show how organizations maintain a balance between enabling and restricting the 
adaptation of practices by specifying, incentivizing and enforcing potentially beneficial 
adaptations, while discouraging undesired adaptations. Finally, while scholars have examined 
adaptation at the field level to show how adopters engage in ‘contextualization work’, to 
achieve a technical, cultural, or political fit with a practice (Gond & Boxenbaum, 
forthcoming), we focus on the intra-organizational level. Specifically, we identify three 
strategies through which an organization balances the tension between keeping the practice 
homogeneous while also allowing local heterogeneity; 1) creating and certifying progressive 
achievement levels; 2) setting the discretionary and mandatory adaptation parameters; and 3) 
differentially adapting to context-specific and systemic misfits.  
Next, we provide theoretical motivations, discuss our method and case, report our findings 
and derive propositions. We conclude with some contributions and implications of our work. 
Theoretical Motivations 
While scholars have long been interested in innovative management practices (e.g., 
Damanpour, 1987; 1991; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981), recent years have seen surging 
interest (Damanpour et al., 2011; Volberda et al., 2013). Some scholars have used the label 
‘management innovations’ defined as ‘the generation and implementation of a management 
practice, process, structure, or technique that is new to the state of the art and intended to 
further organizational goals’, where ‘new’ can be entirely new to the world or new to the firm 
(Birkinshaw, Hamel & Mol, 2008, p.  829). Others have used the term ‘organizational 
practices’, defined as ‘the shared knowledge and competence of the organization, [which] 
tend to be accepted and approved by the organization’s employees and to be viewed as the 
taken-for-granted way of doing certain tasks’ (Kostova, 1999, p.  309-310). We use the term 
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management practices more broadly to refer to symbolic and material activities that reflect 
changes in management work to set directions, make decisions, coordinate activities and 
motivate people and that involve a departure from traditional processes, practices, structures 
and techniques.  
Regardless of the organizational motivation to adopt a management practice – technical, 
social or both – (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), it can rarely be adopted by user organizations as an 
‘off-the-shelf’ solution. Practices are likely to evolve during the implementation process 
requiring domestication, reconfiguration and reconstitution to contextualize them within 
specific organizational environments (Canato et al., forthcoming; Robertson et al., 1996; 
Strang & Kim, 2004). While diffusion research provides valuable insights into the rationale 
behind organizational adoption of management practices (e.g., Abrahamson, 1991; Mol & 
Birkinshaw, 2009; Sturdy, 2004), we need to learn more about how these practices are 
adapted (Drori et al., 2013; Gondo & Amis, 2013; Gond & Boxenbaum, forthcoming).  
Adaptation: Definition, types and dimensions 
Adaptation refers to the process by which an adopter tries to create a better ‘fit’ between a 
practice and the adopters’ particular needs, where fit is ‘the degree to which the 
characteristics of a practice are consistent with the (perceived) needs, objectives, and 
structure of an adopting organization’ (Ansari et al., 2010, p. 68). Adaptation may lead to 
change in the practice but not in the organization (practice adaptation or cooptation); change 
in the organization but not in the practice (organizational change); and change in both the 
organization and the practice (mutual adaptation) (Ansari et al., 2010; Canato et al., 
forthcoming; Lozeau, Langley, & Denis, 2002). Although there will always be some degree 
of mutual adaptation, our focus here is on the adaptation of the practice. 
Adaptation can be seen in terms of fidelity (similarity) and extensiveness (Ansari et al., 
2010; Fiss et al., 2011). Fidelity relates to whether the practice that is being implemented and 
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adapted resembles or deviates in kind from the features of the previous version of the practice 
(true or distant) and is related to the scope and meaning of the practice. Meaning can be 
changed through ‘hybridization’ where adopters combine a practice with local elements 
(Pieterse, 1994) or through ‘re-invention’, where adopters actively change the meaning of the 
practice (Rogers, 1995; Yuan, Fulk, & Monge, 2007). Extensiveness assesses the degree of 
implementation compared to the previous version of the practice. Less extensive 
implementation refers to ‘decoupling’ or surface-level adoption, where implementation is 
symbolic rather than substantive (e.g., Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley et al., 2012). A 
related concept is ‘selective emulation’, where adopters choose not to implement certain 
conflicting features of the practice (Westney, 1987). 
Sources of misfits and practice adaptation 
Technical, cultural, and political incompatibilities or misfits trigger different patterns of 
adaptation among adopters (Ansari et al., 2010; Sturdy, 2004). Technical fit refers to the 
degree to which the characteristics of a practice are compatible with the technological base, 
and the sophistication level of the systems already in use by potential adopters. Cultural fit 
refers to the degree to which a practice is compatible with the cultural values of adopters 
(Canato et al., forthcoming; Detert, Schroeder & Mauriel, 2000; Klein & Sorra, 1996; 
Newman & Nollen, 1996). Political fit refers to the degree to which a practice is compatible 
with the interests, power structures and the agendas of individuals and dominant coalitions in 
an organization (Carlile, 2004; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). 
Adaptations in management practices may emerge at different levels of analysis, namely 
national, industry (inter-organizational) and firm (intra-organizational). Several studies have 
examined the adaptation of practices at the national and inter-organizational levels (e.g., 
Frenkel, 2005; Perez-Aleman, 2011; Strang & Kim, 2004; Zbaracki, 1998). For instance, Fiss 
et al. (2011) identified several strategies of practice variation during the implementation of 
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‘golden parachute’ contracts, a controversial corporate governance practice that diffused 
widely across firms during the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s. Similarly, Gond and 
Boxenbaum (forthcoming) explain how adopters engage in different types of 
‘contextualization work’ in adapting socially responsible investment practices in France and 
Quebec. Fewer studies, however, have examined variations during the implementation of 
practices within organizations, especially in multinational corporations (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1988; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Saka, 2004). As Gondo and Amis (2013, p. 230, emphasis 
original) note: ‘our understanding of what happens within organizations when new practices 
are adopted remains at a distinctly nascent stage.’ 
Intra-organizational adaptation 
Practices are modified intra-organizationally as they penetrate the ‘semi impermeable 
organizational membrane’ (Canato et al., forthcoming; Dooreward & Bijsterweld, 2001). 
Subsidiaries may differ in the degree of fit between the practice and organizational context as 
they confront and intermingle with the practice. On the one hand, MNCs have hierarchical 
control over practice adoption and diffusion. Subsidiaries are not independent entities and the 
corporate parent may mandate subsidiaries into adopting the practice, often referred to as 
‘coercive isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Westney, 1993). On the other hand, 
since foreign subsidiaries operate in host environments with distinct institutional profiles, 
subsidiary managers strive to attend to host country requirements while also conforming to 
the corporate mandate (Kostova & Roth, 2002). In addition, MNCs have complex internal 
environments, with cultural differences, language barriers, and inter-unit power struggles that 
may require local adaptation of a practice (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). 
Corporate parents’ attempts to enforce compliance and prevent adaptation may lead to 
decoupling (low extensiveness), where organizations adopt the practice superficially for 
ceremonial reasons (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Weber, David 
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and Lounsbury (2009) found that decoupling is more likely if coercion was the diffusion 
mechanism. Similarly, Lozeau et al. (2002) argued that if coerced to adopt, organizations will 
tend to respond ceremonially by ‘loose coupling’ between the practice and the organization. 
Thus to accommodate local needs, create buy-in and promote innovation; MNCs may 
consider giving their subsidiaries some latitude in modifying practices. 
Adaptation may be a double-edged sword and both too much and too little adaptation may 
be undesired (cf., Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). If organizations overly restrict subsidiary 
autonomy and the latitude to adapt, adoption may be less extensive (decoupling) (e.g., 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008) and even encounter active resistance (e.g., Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). Also, since practice adaptations may generate creative problem-solving that 
benefits the organization (e.g., Czarniawska-Joerges & Sevón, 1996), restricting adaptation 
may lead to the suppression of potentially valuable local innovations (e.g., Boxenbaum & 
Battilana, 2005). In contrast, if organizations tolerate or encourage subsidiaries to freely 
adapt management practices, the adapted practices may lose their core essence. 
Research Question: How do organizations manage the tension between standardization and 
variation in management practices as they diffuse across different subsidiaries? 
Methods 
We analyzed how the adaptation of a management practice is managed in a multinational 
organization. We chose to study the adoption and adaptation of the management practice 
‘Achieving Competitive Excellence’ (ACE) at Hamilton Sundstrand (HS), a multi-sector 
business unit of the US conglomerate United Technologies Corporation (UTC), for three 
reasons. First, ACE is an innovative management practice integral to UTC’s performance 
model (UTC, 2013) and credited to have significantly contributed to productivity and revenue 
gains (Roth, 2010). Unlike Six Sigma, ACE is a proprietary quality management practice and 
provides a unique case to trace the evolution of a practice in a multinational corporation. 
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Second, we chose to focus on HS, rather than the business unit where the practice originated, 
Pratt & Whitney, because we wanted to understand how a practice gets adapted as it travels 
from one business unit to the other. As a geographically dispersed organization with 
subsidiaries across the US, Asia and Europe, HS was well suited to revealing the dynamics of 
intra-organizational practice adoption and adaptation. Third, since HS is a diversified 
technology and innovation-driven manufacturing company, and relies on localized 
innovations that require both flexibility and autonomy, it allowed us to closely observe the 
tension between standardization and variation. 
Research Context  
ACE. Achieving Competitive Excellence (ACE) is a proprietary quality management system 
developed by UTC – the parent company of HS – for improving and sustaining quality and 
productivity throughout its five business units, encompassing 900 local sites and 220,000 
employees. ACE seeks to improve quality and customer satisfaction, while increasing 
efficiency and reducing waste. Internal estimates suggested that extensive implementation of 
the practice would, on average, generate 35% sales increase, 60% inventory reduction, and 
35% improvement in customer satisfaction (Roth, 2010). As of 2010, ACE consisted of 12 
tools classified into three categories – ‘Decision Making’, ‘Problem Solving’ and ‘Process 
Improvement and Waste Elimination’. But rather than just a set of tools, ACE has been 
termed as the company’s ‘operating system’ (UTC, 2013) comprised of a distinct philosophy 
based on the teaching of the Japanese quality advisor Yuzuru Ito. In contrast to complex 
formulas associated with quality management practices such as Six Sigma, ACE aims at 
production line workers who learn the quality process in a ‘matter of days’ (UTC, 2013). 
Hamilton Sundstrand. Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) is a business unit of United Technologies 
Corporation (NYSE: UTX). With sales of $5.6 billion in 2010 [$6.2 billion in 2012], HS is 
among the world’s largest suppliers of technologically advanced aerospace and industrial 
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products. The company designs, manufactures and services aerospace systems and provides 
integrated system solutions for commercial and military aircraft. HS, headquartered in US has 
18,000 employees across 20 countries in US, Asia and Europe and 56 subsidiaries with over 
150 sites. In 2012, HS was merged with another acquisition, Goodrich, into UTC Aerospace 
Systems, that has grown to 40,000 employees, $12 billion of sales and 177 sites. We use the 
term ‘corporate level’ to refer to HS headquarters that along with the corporate-wide ACE 
Council is the key locus of decision-making in the organization. 
Data Collection  
The primary data sources were interviews and documentary analysis. Interviews allow for an 
in-depth understanding of some of the motives behind practice adaptations (Yin, 2009). We 
interviewed managers and employees of HS identified through purposeful sampling (Patton, 
2002) to acquire rich information on changes in the practice that occurred during 
implementation across subsidiaries in the US (N=3), Europe (N=4) and Asia (N=3). 
Interviewees were selected on the basis of their degree of involvement with the management 
practice, levels of expertise, hierarchical position and length of employment. Most 
interviewees had been with the organization from the initial introduction of ACE and could 
provide a rich chronological account of the evolution of the practice. After the first round of 
interviewing, we conducted follow-up interviews with UTC’s global ACE Director and an 
external expert to invite comments on our nascent findings. In total, twelve semi-structured 
interviews were conducted. In addition, we had numerous informal electronic and face-to-
face exchanges with quality managers throughout HS and UTC. 
We also collected archival data, including publically available information; UTC’s annual 
reports from 1998-2011, shareowner letters, websites of UTC, HS and HS local subsidiaries, 
press releases and newspaper articles. We studied independent and comparative case studies 
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and academic reports on the evolution of ACE within the corporation, including the 
development of different ACE versions over time (e.g., Hutton, 2004; Roth, 2010).  
Data Analysis  
Our analysis proceeded in four steps. First, we chronologically traced the development of the 
management practice pioneered by UTC’s business unit, Pratt & Whitney. We analyzed how 
it was introduced in HS and diffused globally across HS subsidiaries and sites. We used 
‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley, 1999) to identify key moments in the diffusion of the 
practice and centrally orchestrated changes, such as the corporate-wide re-launch of ACE in 
2004. Second, we coded and compared the sections in the data associated with whether, how 
and why the management practice was adapted (Miles & Huberman, 2004). As is typical with 
interpretive research, we cycled iteratively between data and concepts (Locke, 2011; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). Through the use of ‘pattern matching’ (Miles & Huberman, 2004), we 
categorized adaptations according to geographical location and types of misfits – ‘political,’ 
‘technical’ and ‘cultural’ (Ansari et al., 2010; Oliver, 1992; Sturdy, 2004). We then traced 
and catalogued instances for how adaptations contributed to the continuous evolution of the 
management practice. A common theme that emerged was what respondents described as a 
tension between ‘standardization and local autonomy’. Our third step was to seek 
explanations for differentiated responses to varying types of practice adaptations. We found 
that responses depended on whether local variations were perceived as acceptable or even 
beneficial to performance. For example, the different achievement levels we identified 
(bronze, silver and gold) indicated variation with regards to practice implementation. 
Similarly, we distinguished between assessment criteria that were described as non-
negotiable or negotiable when assessed as ‘not relevant’ for the specific recipient unit. We 
refer to the former as mandatory and the latter as discretionary. We grouped different 
management interventions into aggregated conceptual categories. We then identified three 
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strategies of how the organization managed practice adaptations. Finally, we developed 
broader level propositions and a model of managing practice adaptation. 
Findings 
Historical development of ACE 
From the mid-1980s onwards, industry pressures especially from Japanese companies 
entering the American market prompted HS’s parent company UTC to revisit its strategic 
orientation and focus more on quality and processes. Moreover, large competitors such as 
Honeywell and General Electric had adopted quality management practices such as Six 
Sigma initially developed by Motorola. This created additional pressures on UTC to position 
itself as a legitimate competitor (Mazza & Alvarez, 2000). After two failed initial adoptions 
of generic versions, Q+ and Kaizen, in 1991, UTC’s former Chairman and CEO George 
David invited the Japanese quality advisor Yuzuro Ito to join UTC in the quest to develop a 
specialized quality management practice for UTC’s products and services. Japanese-style 
quality management was seen as the solution to reverse the prevailing American production 
mentality focused on scale and standardized products, and to bring back the focus on 
processes, rather than products (Womack & Jones, 1996). The new management practice, 
termed ACE, was a fusion of two lean methodologies: ‘Quality First’ introduced by Yuzuru 
Ito and ‘Flow (Productivity) First’ from the Toyota Production System introduced by the 
consultancy Shingijutsu. ACE also incorporated methodologies from existing quality 
management practices; Kaizen (continuous improvement) and 3P (Production Preparation 
Process). A pilot version was introduced at UTC division, Pratt & Whitney, at the end of 
1996 that focused on the design, manufacture and repair of aircraft engines. 
In 1998, the presidents of UTC’s business units agreed to adopt the quality management 
practice. Once initial flaws in the system were identified and eliminated, ACE was introduced 
throughout the organization, including HS. To facilitate adoption and extend the teachings of 
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Yuzuro Ito, UTC launched the ‘Ito University’ where executives, managers and designated 
ACE experts from local sites were educated on ACE’s basic concepts and implementation 
expectations. The first ‘Ito University’ session was held in Connecticut, USA, followed by 
sessions in Asia and Europe. The attendance of UTC’s CEO and business unit presidents 
reinforced the importance of ACE throughout the organization. 
To extend the teachings and guide the implementation of ACE throughout all business 
units, UTC established an ACE Council composed of representatives from each business unit.  
ACE was introduced to HS global subsidiaries in 1999. The earliest adopters were US-based 
subsidiaries in early 1999, followed by Europe and Asia-based subsidiaries. An ACE team 
was entrusted with implementing the system throughout the different sites. The team’s main 
task was to generate awareness and train employees. Intermediate adopters in Europe were 
introduced to ACE through US-based early adopters. A Dutch representative noted:  
Our people went [US-based locations] to see how it was used there, they trained us, and 
during the implementation, their side came to us to get us through those first few days. 
 
Despite a speedy introduction, more extensive implementation of the practice remained slow-
moving and only accelerated globally when the corporate leadership made ACE a key 
priority. In 2007, subsidiaries were encouraged to advance in their implementation of ACE 
when UTC President & COO, Chênevert publically committed to analysts that 70% of UTC’s 
sites would reach ACE highest achievement levels by 2011. Figure 1 illustrates the diffusion 
of ACE throughout UTC, which is largely reflective of the rates of practice diffusion in HS. 
While in 2006, only 17% of all sites throughout UTC’s five business units had reached ACE 
Gold and Silver status, this figure reached 80% by 2012.  
-------------------Insert Figure1 about here------------------ 
Table 2 provides a historical overview of the development of ACE and its adoption in HS.  
--------------------- Table 2 about here--------------------- 
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Balancing standardization and variation 
Need for standardization and practice alignment. The ACE ‘operating system’ was aimed at 
standardizing and centralizing processes across HS subsidiaries and their production sites to 
implement a coherent strategy throughout the organization. Greater alignment was deemed 
necessary following wide-ranging agreement that the organization had become too 
fragmented as a result of the headquarters’ acquisition strategy. HS subsidiaries ranged from 
Space Systems developed for NASA or the US Military to oil coolers for motorsport in 
Britain and turbine wheels in Singapore. A US manager recalled:  
The absence of a common company goal has really had an effect on what previously 
might have been a good relationship or perception in the marketplace, or not as good as 
it could have been. It was starting to have an impact on what customers thought. 
 
In addition to concerns about customer perceptions, inconsistent processes had led to an 
ineffective and inefficient use of organizational resources. The expanding geographic scope 
across the US, Asia, and Europe added additional pressure on the organization to adopt a 
management practice that would allow standardization of its operations. A unified quality 
standard was, therefore, deemed central to creating synergies and improving communication 
among subsidiaries across industrial sectors and geographical borders. 
Need for variation and flexible adaptation. A frequent data theme encountered was the need 
to balance corporate standardization and local-level autonomy. Giving subsidiaries some 
latitude to take local ownership of ACE was regarded as necessary for building 
organizational and individual commitment to ACE. A US-based manager emphasized the 
importance of ‘not losing sight of the tension between standardization, empowerment and 
engagement’. Based on the founder’s philosophy, improvement was sought through people’s 
development and active participation, described as the ‘spirit of ACE’. A manager stated:  
You need to standardize, but you need to make people part of the decision. People 
become discouraged because the staff already has too much to do. It is very, very 
important to retain the empowerment aspect and some flexibility […], because 
otherwise you lose the whole thing. 
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This flexibility in the application of ACE was important given the diversity of HS 
subsidiaries that operated in a dynamic, technology-driven business environment. 
‘Technology improvements constantly redefine world-class performance and customer 
expectations’, as UTC CEO explained (cited in Roth, 2010: 45), and thus called for a flexible 
approach to encourage rather than hinder local innovations and performance improvements. 
As one ACE manager noted, implementation would require ‘striking a fine balance between 
some structure and the flexibility of allowing the local folks to use it as they see necessary’. 
Technical, cultural and political misfits  
Despite centrally devised ACE assessment criteria, in practice, local sites tended to tailor the 
mix of tools and methods to the needs of their specific context. These adaptations helped to 
implement ACE throughout HS. As a result, however, ACE practice components changed 
significantly during subsequent adoptions. We differentiated these changes along political, 
technical and cultural adaptations of the practice (Ansari et al., 2010). 
Political misfits. When ACE was first proposed as a corporate-wide program, most business 
unit presidents were against the centralization of decision-making and loss of local autonomy. 
ACE required shifts in strategic goals, creating divergent interests and conflict (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). But ACE was mostly perceived as a top-down directive that told division 
presidents and their senior managers what to do. A Businessweek article (2004) stated that: 
Senior management at the operation – and their superiors back at headquarters – had 
essentially pooh-poohed ACE in favour of just churning out more air conditioners and 
heating units. 
 
The centralization of strategy moved decision-making to the corporate level. However, this 
reduced local management authority. Local managers struggled to align their process 
improvements with the centrally mandated practice. A European manager noted: 
Small facilities wanted to move forward and create best practices, but due to a shift in 
the decision-making power; they were lost as to how they contribute to the HS 
organization as a whole. 
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Many sites were thus reluctant to accept increased standardization that ACE prescribed. 
Among employees, their attitude towards quality management systems was negative due to 
two prior failed implementations of external quality management practices Kaizen and Q+. 
There was little motivation among employees to put time and effort into another management 
‘fad’. When a practice is perceived as simply a management fad (Abrahamson, 1991), 
employees tend to question the real value of the practice. As one interviewee recalls:  
In the beginning, there was definite protest against this type of standardization. 
Everybody was required to do things in one way and not always in the way they were 
used to. But the task of those who work with the system is to convince people that in 
the beginning it will be a little more work, but in the end it will provide you with a 
much more efficient process. 
 
In its efforts to promote ACE’s adoption, corporate headquarters encouraged subsidiaries to 
take greater ownership of the practice. This resulted in modifications to ACE as each 
subsidiary developed its own implementation approach. Modifications facilitated adoption 
since ACE was not only a set of tools, but also a philosophy meant to foster a customer-
focused and quality improvement culture. ‘Previously they were really chasing sales. This has 
changed, and besides sales we are now looking at operational excellence’, an interviewee 
explained. This required active employee participation and commitment. In fact, lack of 
practice ownership was cited as a key reason for the failure of previous management practices 
(Q+ and Kaizen) at UTC. A manager (cited in Roth, 2010: 25) who had been involved in the 
development of ACE emphasized the need for local ownership. 
We had bought Q-Plus from Amoco and it never was ours. We knew that we could not 
just unplug Toyota’s TPS method and put it in. That was Toyota's and it had to be 
Toyota’s. We had to utilize best practices but make them ours if it’s not something we 
develop, design, foster, and care for along the way, we are not going to be successful.  
 
Allowing adaptations helped HS overcome political obstacles to ACE’s implementation. The 
need for adaptation may also be affected by the regulatory environment of a subsidiary 
(Kostova, 1999). US-based sites faced national issues concerning trade unions that generally 
disliked the additional work required for implementing ACE. In Singapore, in contrast, ACE 
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benefitted from the supportive influence of the national government. As a Singapore manager 
noted, the government perceived the introduction of ACE as a natural next step in preparing 
employees’ minds to the enforcement of other government policies. 
Technical misfits. ACE had been developed for a slow moving industry while HS operated in 
the rapidly changing aerospace industry. In response to indications of misfits due to the 
differing pace of the industry, ACE underwent a series of transformations during 
implementation, particularly in European sites. When a team of European delegates were sent 
to Asian subsidiaries to introduce ACE and educate staff, local sites were thought to benefit 
from the latest version of ACE. However, some of the adaptations made by European 
counterparts did not fit Asian subsidiaries’ requirements. Moreover, local staff struggled with 
technical complexity. A manager noted:  
ACE involves some complex concepts and that could have been a challenge to some of 
the staff. We are generally dealing with technicians; the level of education is not at a 
Masters Degree level. 
 
Another example of technical misfit was the introduction of an ERP (Enterprise Resource 
Planning) system, which was installed throughout HS sites to centralize data and support 
information sharing. However, initially designed to accommodate US-based firms, the ERP 
system created incompatibilities overseas with respect to currency exchanges and customs 
regulations. Thus, adaptations were needed to allow ERP to be used by non-US subsidiaries. 
Cultural misfits. While ACE tools, methods and assessment criteria had been standardized; 
ACE was implemented by each site in different ways. One major challenge was that ACE 
required the involvement of everyone, from site managers to production line workers. In 
large US-based sites, organizational size made it more difficult to encourage all employees to 
adopt the ‘spirit of ACE’ needed for extensive implementation of ACE. One manager stated:  
One needs a critical mass of people in a large organization to [change culture]. One or 
two people who have that religious conversion experience cannot drive all the change. 
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The smaller size of European adopters allowed a deeper understanding of the management 
practice among all employees. However, low fidelity adaptations often occurred in European 
subsidiaries as employees were used to making autonomous decisions with regards to how 
the practice related to their operations. As a Dutch manager recalled, ‘the Dutch typically 
tend to challenge everything’. In response, local sites typically adapted the practice in scope 
and meaning where they saw fit, as another Dutch manager noted: 
We add our own flavour to [ACE]. The way we have adapted to ACE, and ACE has 
adapted to us is a better result and fits our culture. 
 
European respondents emphasized that “some of the concepts may have been a little bit 
foreign” to their local cultural context. To justify why they did not implement ACE in the 
‘same way,’ respondents referred to the US-centric cultural flavour of the system that did not 
fit European norms and values. Asian sites were described as having the greatest cultural fit 
with the required standardization of processes. As an interviewee noted: 
 [Sites in Asia are] the best at implementation because their culture is highly disciplined 
and they are used to ‘standard’ work’ of quality management practices. 
 
However, similar to US-sites, Asian sites employed large numbers of employees. Conveying 
the message proved challenging and ACE came to be seen as complex and ambiguous. 
Despite a general willingness to comply with centrally prescribed standards, adoption in 
Asian subsidiaries lacked extensiveness and tended to emphasize symbolic aspects of the 
practice. This was also attributed to Asian sites being characterized by ‘passive acceptance’ 
of the management practice, reflecting ‘conviction’ rather than true ‘conversion’. Employees 
could be forced to comply with requirements when they were linked to explicit performance 
measurements on which they were evaluated by their superiors. However, the ultimate aim of 
ACE was to motivate employees to adopt its ‘spirit,’ not only because they were evaluated on 
the basis of implementing ACE, but because they believed that ACE was ‘the right thing to 
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do’. This suggests that when adopters implement the practice passively or without adequate 
reflexivity, it may result in less extensive adoption (Gondo & Amis, 2013).  
Managing practice adaptation 
Rather than requiring rigid adherence, ACE tools were meant to be flexible in their use. 
Initially, practice adaptations were not only tolerated but even promoted to help different 
business units and their subsidiaries adopt ACE and assume greater ownership (such as by 
using different logos). From 2003 onwards, however, UTC grew less tolerant of 
modifications to ACE across its businesses comprising of over 900 sites, as it was seen to 
impede ACE’s wider impact. Adaptation began to be more tightly coordinated by the ACE 
Council and Ito University. These bodies connected people across multiple business units and 
provided a forum to facilitate and capture learning, thereby providing the infrastructure to 
cumulate experiences and to integrate them into the central tools and methodologies of ACE. 
First, ACE Council, consisting of UTC business unit leaders, played an instrumental role 
in managing adaptation and alignment. It was responsible for defining ACE standards for 
certifying Qualifying, Bronze, Silver, and Gold levels as well as overseeing the development 
of ACE materials and training curriculum. It had regular one-day meetings drawing on 
experiences in different divisions to discuss progress and to test new ideas or practices that, if 
successful, could be promoted across UTC (Roth, 2010). Second, Ito University provided the 
‘learning infrastructure’, where employees from geographically dispersed sites not only 
received ACE training, but could also exchange ideas and feedback from their local sites. At 
the end of 2009, over 30,000 UTC employees were taking one of the 120 unique 3-day 
courses in 22 different countries to gain specialist certification at three levels, associate, 
practitioner, and master (Roth, 2010). We identified three interrelated strategies of how 
practice adaptations were managed by the organization.  
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Strategy 1: Creating differentiating achievement levels bronze, silver and gold. Inspired by 
the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the ACE Council introduced differentiated bronze, silver, and 
gold achievement levels to reduce complexity, acknowledge continuous progress and 
motivate adoption. Initially, the highest level of process maturity was defined as ‘certified 
and standardized’, which aimed at ensuring a consistent degree of quality. However, this 
uniform level failed to account for differences in subsidiary capabilities and risked 
overwhelming adopters with the complexities of the practice. Differentiation according to 
achievement levels facilitated practice implementation for first-time adopters, while 
encouraging them to implement the practice more extensively by making differences in 
adoption levels – and comparisons among sites – visible. An ACE manager explained: 
It was created to recognize the fact that it is unreasonable to expect an organization to 
pick up a new concept or practic  that is as complex as this from not knowing anything 
about it to all of a sudden being an expert in this. So this really is recognition that this is 
a journey. It is not an all or nothing, 0 or 1. It is something that you have to take time, 
slowly implement it, see the value of it, get better at it, and then take the next step. I 
think there was recognition that in order to really become good, it takes time. 
 
Reducing complexity also minimized undesirable adaptations that could arise from 
inexperience or insufficient training. ‘If you allow variation with novices, there will probably 
be methodological errors and they are unlikely to achieve the results’, an ACE expert noted. 
Entry levels, Qualifying and Bronze, reduced practice complexity to increase cognitive 
understanding, allowing employees to get familiarized with the practice. The Qualifying level 
provided a performance baseline of training and awareness that encouraged local sites to get 
acquainted with ACE’s basic tools and build positive experiences in the continuing ‘ACE 
journey’. To move from Qualifying to Bronze level, an organization needed to show and 
sustain improvements in its performance targets. For example, a production cell needed to do 
9 out of 12 activities. The idea was that once employees had learnt the ACE basics and seen 
improvements, they could draw on their experience base to progress to more sophisticated 
ACE tools and methods in increasingly complex situations. An ACE Manager explained: 
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We recognize that change takes many years, it doesn’t happen overnight. And we’re 
willing to make that investment, take incremental steps. If you take huge steps, you see 
may the benefit quickly, but it’s not sustainable. 
 
To move from Bronze to Silver, organizations needed to show their commitment to stretching 
performance goals and to sustain performance improvements. For example, a production cell 
needed to do 12 out of 16 activities. Finally, to be certified as ACE Gold, sites needed to 
provide highest performing levels over twelve consecutive months. An ACE manager noted: 
We really strive for putting processes in place that are repeatable and sustainable; so 
that once you get there we know you will stay there. So you can start focusing on 
bigger and better things, rather than continuing to deal with short term issues, and fire 
fighting that takes you away from longer term visions and development programmes, 
products and services necessary for company growth. 
 
As best-in-class, they also had to demonstrate their ability to create innovative tools that 
continuously improved performance. At Gold level, adopters were expected to have reached a 
higher level of maturity to make more informed variations ‘because they understand what 
they’re doing actually achieves the results that are intended,’ an ACE expert explained.  
 Different achievement levels created competitive dynamics and ‘escalating commitments’ 
(Ghemawat, 1991) that encouraged sites to improve their ACE performance and move up to 
the next achievement level. To incentivize performance, ACE achievements were linked with 
bonus payments. Moreover, ACE Council created a web-based system that allowed managers 
to view and compare ACE status by business units, subsidiaries, sites, or applications area 
and view trends in each category. This internal comparability created transparency and 
encouraged leaders to promote ACE throughout their sites. An ACE manager explained: 
At first there was a push. ‘How are we getting people to do that?’ Now, it becomes very 
competitive, where sites really want to achieve higher levels of ACE (Silver and Gold). 
People often get formally rewarded to get to higher levels of ACE. However, it is not 
mandatory, and we leave it to the discretion of the division as to whether or not they 
want to make a formal reward to leaders or recognize and reward individuals. But even 
if these don’t exist, we find that the pure competitive nature continues to drive these 
organizations to want to get to higher and higher levels. 
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Certification criteria and standards for each ACE certification level were developed and 
updated by the ACE Council. To encourage continuous improvement even among the 
highest-performing sites, the criteria for being awarded an achievement level such as Gold 
were dynamic to meet shifting customer expectations associated with that level. One manager 
noted that Gold certification did not mean contentment but continuous improvement: 
It will become a challenge for ACE to keep shifting the standards, higher and higher. 
What used to be ‘gold’ standard is not enough anymore. 
 
A manager noted that sustained improvement would soon need to be recognized with a 
‘platinum’ standard in order to enable high performing sites to stand out 
Strategy 2: Identifying mandatory and discretionary practice attributes. The second strategy 
that we identified to manage practice adaptation was to define which practice attributes were 
mandatory versus those which could be negotiated at the local level. Some basic attributes 
were considered mandatory with no allowance for adaptations. An ACE expert explained; 
‘what is least acceptable is variation around metrics’ to assess performance. While the use of 
specific performance metrics was mandatory, adopters had latitude in adapting ACE tools as 
long as they could show that their adaptations led to consistently improved performance. The 
idea was not to make the tools an end in themselves but to enable desired performance 
outcomes. When ACE requirements were seen to undermine the overall aim to increase 
organizational efficiency and innovation, adaptations were accommodated.  
To illustrate how mandatory parameters were standardized for different ACE tools while 
allowing local negotiation in meeting these parameters, consider the example of QCPC 
(Quality Clinic Process Charting). This central ACE tool required sites to create a formal 
process of capturing inefficiencies or problems at work. QCPC was applicable to a wide 
range of processes and functions, from manufacturing to human resources. Yet, sites were not 
required to rigidly comply with every single aspect of the tool. An ACE Manager explained 
how the QCPC tool was meant to work: 
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Every single person, every single day, sits back and says ‘today or this week I had two 
or three things go wrong that really shouldn’t have gone wrong. Or if they didn’t go 
wrong what are the things that would have made my job easier or benefitted customers? 
So that’s the tool. We don’t go round and tell them, you gotta capture 1 a day, or 2 a 
day, or 5 a day. Each region, each culture does things a little differently. We say take 
the concept, show us you understand it and use it, but use it in a manner that makes 
sense in your organization. So we give them the standard and the structure but we allow 
them flexibility to implement it in a way that they feel adds value to them. 
 
At a Dutch site, for example, compliance required employees to spend excessive time on 
recording hundreds of measurements for analyzing inefficiencies. ACE was then adapted, as 
a narrow focus on compliance undermined the overarching purpose of the practice. The 
creation of discretionary aspects aimed at empowering production line workers to take more 
responsibility for problem solving. As a European-based interviewee explained how they 
implemented ACE, ‘we don’t change the fundamentals […] but we don’t feel obliged or 
pressured to do it exactly the same way as [US-based sites]’.  
However, the company needed to maintain a certain level of uniformity in ACE’s 
implementation. An ACE manager noted that ‘there is always that balance’ and continued: 
You gotta give them [subsidiaries] some guidelines and standards around whatever it is 
you’re trying to accomplish. So you need some limitations; otherwise it takes a life of 
its own and then it will be different everywhere. 
 
For example, cultural differences led sites in different countries to translate ACE training 
materials, but also to create unique, local logos. While the variation was initially tolerated to 
give adopters greater ownership of the practice, it was later deemed an obstacle to making 
ACE a unifying operating system. In 2005, the ACE Council decided to create a common 
ACE logo for all subsidiaries as a symbolic gesture of unity and coherence. UTC’s Vice 
President for Quality and Manufacturing explained ACE Graphic Guidelines in a memo: 
Over time we’ve seen a proliferation of images representing the program that didn’t 
meet the ACE principles of a single culture, a primary set of tools, and the competency 
to implement the culture and the tools in everything we do. 
 
Page 23 of 53
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/orgstudies
Organization Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
23 
 
The ‘new ACE logo is more than just a design,’ he continued, but ‘represents unity and 
consistency’ and is ‘a visual symbol of the message that ACE is the single operating system 
across our global company’.  
Strategy 3: Identifying context-specific and systemic misfits to develop a continually 
improving practice version. The management practice has changed considerably through a 
continuous learning loop that promoted improvements by addressing different types of 
misfits. We identified two different types of misfits, which resulted in differentiated corporate 
responses; context-specific and systemic misfits of the practice.  
Context-specific misfits were those that related to idiosyncratic local conditions and did not 
invite centrally moderated adaptations to the practice itself. For example, French employees 
were less willing to work with an English interface. This misfit was locally resolved by 
replacing the English interface with a French interface.  
Systemic misfits, in contrast, hindered the effectiveness of the practice largely independently 
from the specific context in which the practice was implemented. Such misfits were taken 
seriously by the ACE Council and efforts were made to identify root causes and potentially 
change the practice itself. The ACE Council provided what Roth (2010: 12) calls a ‘learning 
architecture’, for identifying systemic misfits, discussing necessary changes and adapting 
ACE tools based on continuous expertise provided by local plant managers and employees: 
‘What emerged from the middle and front lines of UTC’s companies was integrated and 
codified by the ACE Council at corporate levels.’ As a manager emphasized: 
Almost all of the changes typically bubble up from customers to divisions. When ACE 
Council staff are travelling around the world, and visiting all 800 sites, they are seeing 
things that are not working well or things that are working well…‘Hey I have been to 
[specific site] and saw something really interesting,’ so they would typically discuss 
these issues in this forum, and come up with recommendations of changes. 
 
ACE therefore continually evolved through cumulative experience, ongoing feedback and 
improvisation. UTC’s ACE Director explained: 
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The way this programme has worked is and will continue to work that it is not a 
stagnant programme. Every time we learn about new tools or new ideas or new ways of 
getting leadership and the people to adopt it. You know, it’s got to be flexible. And it’s 
got to be something that can absorb these new concepts so that it continues to do well. 
 
While initially ‘ACE was still Pratt & Whitney’s program’ (first UTC ACE Director cited in 
Roth, 2010: 28), over time ACE evolved from a pilot consisting of 7 tools in 1996 to a 
corporate-wide system consisting of 12 tools and a supporting infrastructure of ACE Council 
and Ito University. An ACE manager reflected on how, throughout his 15 years of experience 
with ACE, the practice had changed through either internal or external learnings: 
One of the things we’ve learnt is that we’re constantly upgrading it and changing it, and 
learning from either experiences that people in different divisions are having when 
things aren’t going well so we have to change things, or they’re going really well, so 
we’d want to multiply that, or we’re learning things from outside organizations. So that 
we can bring that into ACE in a way that the entire organization can benefit from that.  
 
The ACE Council was vital to allowing business units to take ownership of practice changes. 
An ACE Manager noted: 
It is really important that every division is represented on that team, so even if the 
concept comes from the top down, we allow people in the organization to create what it 
should look like and get implemented in the way they would like to see it implemented. 
Once you have buy-in and consensus from the divisions, you know it is going to be 
successful. We’d rather take a little extra time to create that buy-in and consensus and 
help them to create the solutions so that in the end you know it will work. 
 
Adaptation in response to systemic misfits is illustrated by the shift from focusing on 
individual cells to focusing on ‘value stream thinking’. ACE had introduced the ‘cell concept’ 
to re-organize manufacturing processes more flexibly by restructuring production plants into 
semi-independent cells. But after intensive research and surveys starting in 2001, the ACE 
Council realized that the focus on individual cells neglected processes that spanned cells. 
Thus, positive results for an individual cell did not accumulate across cells and failed to be 
translated downstream to customers.  
After a major revision process, a new version of ACE was launched in 2004 with a new 
site-level focus that incorporated ‘value stream’ thinking. ‘That was another ‘a-ha’ moment 
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for us’, as a manager (cited in Roth, 2010: 35) explained the need to come ‘to the system 
view.’ Under this approach, the focus for ACE shifted from individual cells to production 
sites. To qualify as an ACE Gold site, all participating cells now needed to be certified gold 
in addition to achieving site performance requirements. In some cases, local subsidiaries 
resolved systemic misfits in innovative ways. These innovations were then carried over to 
other subsidiaries. An ACE expert explains: 
They [subsidiaries] varied the methodologies and adapted them to their specific 
situation to improve performance. And then some of these adaptations have gone back 
in terms of becoming best practices that are promoted in other sites. It is a larger 
corporate learning process. 
 
To encourage learning from successful sites and diffuse best practices, ‘benchmarking’ 
was introduced. A manager noted: 
Benchmarking both internally and externally is part of the ACE process. [...] It is a 
fantastic way to transfer best practices and to standardize best practices.  
 
Staff were sent to high performing sites within HS, other UTC divisions and external 
companies in order to identify world-class performance and highest levels of ‘competitive 
excellence’. An ACE expert emphasized that learning from high-performing peers ‘builds 
enthusiasm’ about the effectiveness of ACE. He further noted:  
Continuous improvement is based on looking at best practices within different divisions 
and who is successful, what are the key elements of what they’ve done and package 
that as training to put out for other sites to utilize and adopt. 
 
Once the root causes of systemic misfits and best practice adaptations were identified, 
improved criteria were standardized and integrated into existing ACE tools and methods. Ito 
University courses, curricula and teaching materials were then upgraded to disseminate the 
learning throughout the organization.  
A Model of Managing Practice Adaptation 
In this section, we draw on the three strategies identified above to present a model of 
managing adaptation at the intra-organizational level. The model is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Page 26 of 53
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/orgstudies
Organization Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
26 
 
---------------------Insert Figure 2 about here--------------------- 
The first and second strategies relate to how organizations manage adaptation as the 
practice is implemented at the local level. The third strategy relates to continuous 
improvement of the practice based on aggregate learning from local misfits and the 
innovations they may trigger. If localized innovations are perceived to be beneficial, 
corporate headquarters may become more receptive to these adaptations and willing to 
incorporate them into improving the overall practice. Based on each strategy we now derive 
broader theoretical arguments. 
For managing adaptation at the local level, the first strategy we identified was to introduce 
differentiated achievement levels (Qualifying, Bronze, Silver, and Gold). This reflected 
higher levels of practice complexity in order to acknowledge and encourage ongoing progress 
and motivate implementation among different subsidiaries. For instance, the Qualifying level 
encouraged entry, and Bronze paved the path for sites to progressively move up to the next 
achievement level (Silver and Gold) during their ‘ACE journey’. Prior work has shown that 
practice complexity – more practice components and higher ambiguity regarding the links 
between these components (Lillrank, 1995; Pelz, 1985) – may lead to intended or unintended 
variations arising from lack of understanding (e.g., Rogers, 1995; Tornatzky & Klein, 1982). 
Therefore, progressive achievement levels may promote overall implementation and broader 
diffusion. Another example is Six Sigma in 3M, where individual employees gain progressive 
qualifications from ‘Green Belts’ to ‘Black Belts’ and then join a central division that advises 
other units on Six Sigma (Canato et al., forthcoming). 
Recipient units need to develop absorptive and retentive capabilities to adopt practices 
(Szulanski, 1996). Practice adoption entails establishing new routines, building a common 
understanding of certain practice components (Perez-Aleman, 2011), and creating situational 
knowing, all of which cannot be enforced through setting rules and enforcing goals (Nicolini, 
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2011). Adopters develop capabilities gradually through doing, experimenting, and 
participating (Bechky, 2003; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000, Orlikowski, 2002). If an 
organization enforces a uniform level of achievement for complex practices throughout its 
subsidiaries, it may not be able to accommodate subsidiary differences in terms of their 
capabilities and capacities. Introducing a complex practice ‘full blown’ may lead to 
undesirable adaptations in certain subsidiaries unable to handle higher complexity levels due 
to capability or knowledge deficits (Kostova & Roth, 2002). The difficulties arising from 
implementing practices full blown, especially in small companies, is well documented and a 
more staggered manner of adoption with ‘tepid steps’ rather than large ‘change leaps’ has 
been suggested (Henricks, 1992; Turesky & Connell, 2010).  
As we saw in the case of ACE, creating progressive achievement levels allowed the 
practice to be implemented in line with the differential capability levels among subsidiaries. 
It cajoled reluctant employees into cooperation (when evidence of positive results of the 
practice became more visible) and mitigated their skepticism or resistance. Progressive 
achievement levels may reduce the likelihood of decoupling or defensive adaptation and lead 
to more extensive implementation over time. This leads to the following proposition.  
Proposition 1: Creating differentiated achievement levels (rather than a uniform 
achievement level) in the design of a management practice is likely to lead to more 
extensive implementation of the practice. 
 
The second strategy we identified was setting mandatory and discretionary practice attributes 
with regards to local practice adaptation in order to manage the ‘trade-off’ between 
extensiveness and fidelity in adaptation. The trade-off results from the following tension: 
Some types of deviation from a practice template can increase the risk of failure (Winter et 
al., 2012). These aspects of a practice are considered ‘core’. Their substantial adaptation ‘in 
kind’ is unacceptable and high fidelity is desired. However, enforcing high fidelity (low 
subsidiary autonomy for adaptation) may lead to decoupling (less extensive implementation) 
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(Weber al., 2009), trigger cultural and political backlash or even stifle learning and 
innovation (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Parast, 2011). For example, Six Sigma repressed 
entrepreneurship in 3M, where tolerance for mistakes and the encouragement of initiative 
were considered key pillars of 3M’s culture (Canato et al., forthcoming). ‘Controlled’ 
discretion to experiment at the local level may allow incremental innovations in the context 
of standardized practices (Wright, Sturdy, & Wylie, 2012). For some aspects, therefore, low 
fidelity adaptation may be tolerated or even encouraged. But allowing everything to be ‘up 
for grabs’ and giving a carte blanche for substantive (low fidelity) modifications (high 
subsidiary autonomy) may lead to loss of the practice’s integrity arising from multiple 
idiosyncratic versions. This may create coordination problems within the organization.  
Defining the boundaries of adaptation by drawing a clear distinction between mandatory 
‘core’ aspects of a practice and discretionary ‘peripheral’ aspects of a practice may enable an 
organization to preserve fidelity and prevent undesirable deviation. Setting clear signals about 
and channeling attention to core and critical aspects can limit local variation to less critical 
aspects. What is discretionary and mandatory may, however, change over time depending on 
the stage of practice diffusion. In our case, subsidiaries initially had the autonomy to adapt 
the ACE logo. Later, a single companywide logo was mandated as a symbol of unity of 
purpose. While what is discretionary and mandatory would depend on the type of practice, its 
level of maturity and the context, defining these parameters can allow for more effective 
management of the extensiveness/fidelity trade-off. We therefore, propose:  
Proposition 2: By defining and controlling discretionary aspects (allowing or encouraging 
adaptation) and mandatory aspects (restricting adaptation) of a practice, organizations 
are likely to more effectively manage the trade-off between extensiveness and fidelity of a 
management practice. 
 
The third strategy to manage adaptation that we identified at the corporate level was to 
discern and differentially adapt to context-specific (local) and systemic (companywide) 
misfits based on cumulative experience, ongoing feedback and improvisation. Adaptations 
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addressing context-specific misfits, such as language translations of communication interfaces 
and training materials, are related to idiosyncratic local conditions. Therefore, they do not 
warrant centrally moderated changes to the practice itself. Adaptations addressing systemic 
misfits, in contrast, influence overall practice effectiveness. For example, when subsidiary 
feedback revealed that performance improvements did not transfer across different elements 
of a functional unit, this systemic misfit was addressed by synchronizing activities across all 
participating cells to get them to the same achievement level. This subsidiary-led change fed 
into creating the next ACE version with a site-level instead of a cell-level focus. Thus, 
adaptations from local subsidiaries that were seen to have ‘wider ramifications’ for the 
company were integrated and codified at the corporate level, leading to modifications of the 
practice. However, other emergent adaptations seen as context-specific were not incorporated 
into the next version of the practice. Differentiating between practice adaptations and 
incorporating adaptations to systemic but not localized, idiosyncratic misfits can lead to an 
improved version of the practice for subsequent diffusion. We therefore propose:  
Proposition 3: Incorporating adaptations to systemic misfits but not idiosyncratic 
(context-specific) misfits into a practice is likely to lead to continually improved versions 
of the practice for subsequent adoption and diffusion. 
 
Discussion 
Innovative management practices, also referred to as management innovations, play a crucial 
role in the development of competitive advantage (Birkinshaw et al., 2008; Teece, 2007; 
Volberda et al., 2013). By treating practice variation and heterogeneity as inseparable from 
the diffusion of practices and by examining how contested practices are modified during 
implementation, we connect with the debates surrounding innovative management practices 
and their changing nature. Adaptation during implementation is not unexpected given that 
adopters strive to change practices that ‘fall short of ideals’ (Rerup & Feldman, 2011), 
including quality management practices (Baird, Hu & Reeve, 2011; Zu, Robbins & 
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Fredendall, 2010). In fact, attempts at preventing adaptation may even hinder practice 
diffusion (Alcouffe, Berland & Levant, 2008). We argue that adaptation may even be a 
necessary condition for diffusion rather than something that only happens during diffusion or 
as an outcome of diffusion.  
Specifically, we focus on the way a management practice is differentially adapted at the 
intra-organizational level. Previous research, often at the inter-organizational or national 
levels, has shown that management practices are adapted and customized to ‘fit’ the site-
specific context (Ansari et al., 2010). We advocate a better understanding of how 
organizations manage the adaptation process and how they strive to strike a balance between 
extensive and high fidelity implementation and local adaptation to accommodate context 
idiosyncrasies, such as technical systems, organizational culture and political landscapes.  
Contributions  
By examining how a diversified, multinational corporation manages the adaptation of a 
management practice, we make several contributions. First, we extend arguments about how 
practices vary as they diffuse (Ansari et al., 2010) and how their diffusion may actually be 
promoted by allowing sufficient space for particular types of adaptation. Specifically, we 
show how practices may diffuse because they are engineered to vary in diverse local 
contexts. Building in a degree of plasticity and allowing adaptation in line with different 
contextual specificities (Benders & van Veen, 2001) can increase the zone of acceptance for 
the practice, reduce resistance and promote more extensive implementation (less decoupling).  
Second, we show how organizations maintain a delicate balance between standardizing 
practices and allowing local adaptation. They do so by specifying, incentivizing and 
enforcing certain types of compliance where adaptation is undesired, while also tolerating or 
encouraging local adaptation that is viewed as potentially beneficial for the organization. 
Maintaining an optimal balance between standardization and variation can be compared to 
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what has been described as ‘meta-standardization’ in the context of sustainability standards 
(Reinecke, Manning & Hagen, 2012). Meta-standardization leads to convergence at the ‘rules 
of the game’ level (homogeneity), but also allows differentiation at the attributes level 
(heterogeneity), which enables parties to adapt practices as per local requirements.  
Third, we shift conversation from the how and why of practice adaptation to its active 
management at the intra-organizational level. At the organization level, scholars have 
explained different patterns of adoption from ‘active’ to ‘minimal’ (Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
At the inter-organizational level, scholars have examined how adopters carry out 
‘contextualization work’ – filtering, repurposing and coupling – to achieve a technical, 
cultural, or political fit (Bromley et al., 2012; Gond & Boxenbaum, forthcoming). In contrast, 
we focus on how organizations may anticipate and influence local adaptations. We identified 
three strategies through which an organization balances the tension between standardization 
and variation of a management practice by engineering variation and accommodating 
contextual specificities through: 1) creating and certifying progressive achievement levels; 2) 
setting discretionary and mandatory adaptation parameters; and 3) differentially adapting to 
context-specific and systemic misfits. 
Theoretical implications 
First, our argument that practices may diffuse because they are engineered to vary, or that 
building in adaptability promotes practice diffusion, resonates with the notion of ‘interpretive 
flexibility’ (Bijker & Law, 1994). Leaving a practice sufficiently flexible can provide a 
‘toolbag of disparate elements into which anyone can dip and extract what they want’ (Jones 
& Dugdale, 2002, p. 155). For management practices, this notion suggests that certain 
practices lend themselves to multiple interpretations and can be adapted to multiple agendas 
(Benders & van Veen, 2001; Giroux, 2006). Allowing adopters to flexibly appropriate and 
adapt the practice can help reconcile competing interests and overcome political resistance to 
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practice adoption (Becker, Messner, & Schaffer, 2013; Jones & Dugdale, 2002). Plasticity 
may also enhance the longevity of a practice by enabling it to accommodate changing 
interests and agendas (Heusinkveld, Benders, & Hillebrand, 2013).  
Adaptation may promote practice diffusion and excessive emphasis on the ‘purity’ of 
practice may retard adoption and diffusion as illustrated in the case of cost-accounting 
methods (Alcouffe, Berland and Levant, 2008). Keeping a practice ‘open’ may, therefore, 
enable wider enrollment through allowing association with other ideas and practices as 
Cooper et al. (2011) demonstrated for the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). We suggest that even 
successful management practices may benefit from being constantly revisited, modified and 
adjusted to account for heterogeneous industry specificities and recipient contexts. Building 
adaptability into these practices can encourage adoption and more extensive implementation.  
Second, our arguments have implications for how multinational organizations in complex 
institutional environments experience and respond to multiple and potentially contradictory 
institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kostova et al., 2008). This may lead to a 
dilemma between preserving the core identity of the practice (fidelity) and allowing 
flexibility that may promote adoption and diffusion. For example, multinationals strive to 
manage the paradoxical pressures between the global standardization of products, services 
and practices, and their local repackaging. This tension between global integration and local 
responsiveness has been described by some as ‘glocalization’ (Drori et al., 2013; Robertson, 
1995; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993). Managing this tension is an ongoing 
challenge for multinational enterprises across a range of functions (Wöcke, Bendixen & 
Rijamampianina, 2007). We suggest that organizations manage the dilemma between 
integration/differentiation, standardization/adaptation or homogeneity/heterogeneity through 
anticipating and actively engineering the practice adaptation process, as against simply 
responding to emergent adaptations arising from different kinds of misfits. 
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Managerial implications 
First, our findings suggest the importance of being continually aware that relatively high or 
low levels of adaptation activities may lead to undesired outcomes. The ‘too much-of- a-
good-thing effect (TMGT effect)’ is applicable to a broad range of phenomena in the field of 
management (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). For instance, vertical integration and outsourcing can 
lead to detrimental outcomes when taken too far. Similarly, while diversification may reduce 
risk and increase efficiencies, too much diversification can hurt performance. Also, too much 
exploration (i.e., the pursuit and acquisition of new knowledge) can damage performance just 
like over reliance on exploitation (i.e., the use of past or incremental knowledge) (March, 
1991). Finally, while open innovation has often been celebrated (e.g., Chesbrough, 2006), too 
much openness hurts performance (Laursen & Salter, 2006). As in these cases, adaptation 
may also have a curvilinear relationship with performance. Organizations strive to be 
ambidextrous (cf., Benner & Tushman, 2003) and seek a balance between allowing too much 
adaptation that compromises the core practice, or too little adaptation that may lead to 
decoupling, resistance or the stifling of potentially beneficial localized innovations.  
Second, in managing adaptations in management practices, an organization needs to tread 
a fine line between discretionary and mandatory practice attributes and between systemic and 
subsidiary-specific misfits. While this is not straightforward, doing so to improve the overall 
management practice would arguably improve ‘fit’ and lead to more extensive 
implementation. Misfits and subsequent adaptation of management practices, like other 
change processes, do not come without their costs – both financial and cognitive. Managers 
can, therefore, not only focus on improving practice fit, ex post, but also engineer its design, 
ex ante, in a manner that minimizes potential misfit. In addition to designing adaptability, 
creating buy-in for innovative management practices is critical as implementation is not just 
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based on compliance or unreflective adoption, but is rather driven by commitment and 
conviction among subsidiary managers and employees. 
Boundary conditions and future research avenues 
We have argued for the active management of practice adaptation that may be desirable for 
promoting adoption and broader dissemination. However, in some cases, the imitation and 
replication of a successful organizational practice may be desirable (Szulanski, 1996; 
Szulanski & Winter, 2002). Chain organizations, such as McDonalds, Wal-Mart, and IKEA 
compete and grow in national and international markets often by replicating an accurate copy 
of the original successful template.  In these cases, ‘modifications turn out to be deleterious to 
performance, even when such attempts are deemed ex ante as sensible, promising, or 
desirable’ and potentially harm the ‘adapting units’ (Winter et al., 2012, p. 673). However, 
this ‘template logic’ or a uniformity imperative may not hold in cases where more flexibility 
is required, such as non-standardized products and procedures. If the practice transferred is 
complex and involves a high degree of causal ambiguity about critical factors and their 
interaction (e.g., if knowledge is embodied in highly tacit human skills) (Szulanski, 1996), 
fidelity may be difficult to enforce. For organizations that produce specialized, custom-made 
goods and thus rely heavily on flexible procedures, a standardized quality management 
system reduces flexibility and may become an obstacle (Beck & Walgenbach, 2007). Also, 
causal ambiguity creates uncertainty about how critical factors might interact with recipient 
environments, and potentially increases the need for local adaptation. In addition, uniform 
practice templates are unlikely to accommodate the needs of highly diversified organizations 
that operate in multiple markets. Examples include GE, ranging from financial services to 
power generation, or Virgin group, ranging from music to air travel.  
While the use of a single exploratory case study has limitations, it allowed us to 
transparently explore how a management practice was adapted across subsidiaries and how 
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the organization actively managed this adaptation process. We studied a proprietary practice 
developed and owned by the company to meet its specific needs and then adopted by its 
different business units and their subsidiaries. The degree of freedom to adapt is limited for 
quality management practices that are commercially available in the marketplace and thus 
externally controlled or certified, such as Six Sigma or ISO 9000. We nevertheless, observed 
significant adaptations, even for a practice that was tailored for a company.  
Future research can explore how adaptation patterns may differ between proprietarily 
developed and ‘off the shelf’ practices. Comparative case studies may provide further 
insights into the management and performance effects of adaptations to management 
practices. Organizations vary in the degree of influence and hierarchical control that the 
parent exercises over its subsidiaries to manage and control variation. Attention to the 
relationships and different kinds of interdependencies between the parent and subsidiaries 
may thus provide further insights into the adaptation process. Also, once a practice matures 
and has ‘proven its worth’, there may be less reason to question it or to reinvent it. However, 
as adopters become more knowledgeable about the practice over time, they may be able to 
make more informed adaptations to the practice. Future research can examine how the 
maturity levels of the practice and of the adopters co-evolve and shape the adaptation 
process. Finally, while we focused on adaptations at the intra-organizational level, more 
research is needed on how adaptations are managed across organizational boundaries with 
regards to other stakeholders such as suppliers and customers. 
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Table 1: Development of ACE 
 
Year Event 
1994 Yuzuru Ito works at quality advisor to UTC’s CEO George David to develop a 
specialized quality management practice  
1992-
1996 
A new quality management practice is developed based on existing Kaizen 
(Shingijutsu 1991) Toyota (Lean) Production System, Process Control and Yuzuru 
Ito’s quality philosophy. 
1996 The new practice pilot is introduced to UTC business unit Pratt & Whitney  
7 ACE tools: 
New 5S (Sort, Straighten, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain) - visual workplace / 
Process Certification / Standard Work / Total Productive Maintenance / Set-up 
Reduction / QCPC (Quality Clinic Process Charting)/ Relentless Root Cause Analysis 
(RRCA) / Mistake Proofing 
July 
1998 
After three months of negotiation, all of UTC’s business units agree to adopt ACE. An 
ACE Council is established to review, manage and improve companywide adoption.  
1998 10 ACE tools with focus on cells 
New 6S - visual workplace Process Management / Process Certification  / Standard 
Work / Total Productive Maintenance / Set-up Reduction / Market Feedback Analysis 
(MFA) / QCPC (Quality Clinic Process Charting) / Relentless Root Cause Analysis 
(RRCA) / Mistake Proofing / Passport 
1998 Ito University is launched to train employees on ACE 
1999 Hamilton-Sundstrand is formed from the merger of UTC business unit Hamilton 
Standard with newly acquired Sundstrand Corporation 
1999 ACE is introduced to Hamilton Sundstrand. 
2001 ACE Council acknowledging efforts were falling short of expectations. Performance 
gaps are analyzed. Outcome; employees are not educated well enough to maximize the 
potential of ACE 
2004 Re-launch of ACE with a site level focus in combination with the creation of “a 
manufacturing centric approach.” Value Stream Management and Production 
Preparation Process (3P) added to ACE.  
2001-
2003 
Strategic plan to deepen implementation of ACE is developed, including greater 
standardization of ACE. 
2004 Good practice benchmarking is added to ACE.    
May 
2006 
Less than 3% (=26) of UTC’s total sites are ACE Gold sites  ACE Council identifies 
ACE barriers 
March 
2007 
UTC Chairman & CEO, Louis Chênevert publicly committing to 70% ACE Silver and 
Gold sites by 2009 (of a total of 900 sites) 
2007 ACE Supplier Gold program launched 
2008 12 ACE Tools: 
Process Improvement and Waste Elimination 
1. 5S-visualworkplace / 2. Value Stream Management  / 3. Process Control & 
Certification / 4. Standard Work / 5. Production Preparation Process (3P) / 6. Total 
Productive Maintenance / 7. Set-up Reduction 
Problem Solving 
8.  Market Feedback Analysis (MFA) / 9.  QCPC (Quality Clinic Process Charting)  
/10. Relentless Root Cause Analysis (RRCA) / 11. Mistake Proofing 
Decision Making 
12. Passport Process 
Feb 
2009 
UTC Chairman & CEO, Louis Chênevert publicly committing to 70% of UTC key 
supplier certifications by 2011 
2012 80% UTC Total ACE Gold and Silver sites 
2012 UTC Aerospace Systems is formed by combining Hamilton Sundstrand and Goodrich 
2013 Launch of 13th ACE tool containing stronger element around ‘Lean’  
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Table 2: Sources of Adaptations in ACE 
 
Site 
location United States Europe Asia 
Depth of Adoption 
Extensive-
ness 
Moderate 
extensiveness 
High extensiveness Moderate-Low 
extensiveness 
Fidelity High-Moderate 
fidelity 
Moderate fidelity High-Moderate fidelity 
Sources of Adaptations 
Political  Political resistance by 
trade unions due to 
additional work-
related tasks and fear 
of downsizing. 
Perceived absence of 
a common goal. 
Management 
resistance to 
diminishing of local 
autonomy. 
Employee initial 
resistance to 
standardization. After 
results were 
presented, employees 
were convinced. 
Political support for 
quality enhancement 
programmes by local 
governments. 
Employees more job 
dependent and held HS in 
high esteem. 
Technical  Sites have large 
number of employees. 
Difficulties to achieve 
training, skills and 
development for all 
employees. 
Sites coped with 
complexity. Misfits 
with technologies and 
systems already in 
use.  
 
Local sites struggled with 
the complexity of 
concepts and tools due to 
generally limited levels 
of education, experience, 
and training of staff.  
ACE was perceived as a 
rigid structure and no 
attempts, bottom-up, 
were made to adapt the 
practice. However, 
aspects of ACE that did 
not seem relevant were 
simply avoided. 
Cultural  Employees regarded 
the practice as 
homegrown. 
However, practice 
required major 
transformation in 
organizational culture 
from product- to 
process-centric. 
 
Employees respected 
the fundamental 
concepts of ACE and 
embraced the “spirit 
of ACE”, but 
questioned the US-
centric aspects. They 
believed in taking 
ownership, rather than 
simply doing what 
they are told. They 
thereby implemented 
ACE the way they 
saw fit. 
Employees believed in  
the appropriateness of the 
practice, and did not 
challenge the need for 
disciplined standard 
work. 
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Figure 1: Total ACE Gold and Silver sites (UTC globally) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A Model of Managing Practice Adaptation 
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